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Abstract 
 
The Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami on March 11th 2011 caused mass destruction, 
significant loss-of-life and a large displacement of people. It also placed significant strain of 
Japan’s electricity-generating infrastructure. There was a significant reduction in capacity due to 
the damage in thermal generation and gradual closure of Japan’s nuclear power plants; the 
ability for load-balancing across the Japanese grid was compromised due to limited 
interconnections between the different utilities that comprise the Japanese electricity system. 
This paper looks at the first fifteen months following the earthquake and tsunami: outlining the 
supply reduction and consequent attempts to manage the demand. In turn it highlights the 
foibles of Japan’s vertically-integrated monopolistic structures and the evolution of 
governmental and utilities response that went from decisions made “on-the-fly” to a more 
developed policy for peak-demand electricity savings. The findings from this paper should serve 
as a useful set of examples to aid decision makers in contingency planning for disruptive large-
scale reduction in electricity-generating capacity. 
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1. Introduction 
 
At 14:46 JST on Friday March 11th, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake occurred off the coast of Japan. 
It was the most powerful earthquake ever to have hit Japan and one of the five most powerful 
anywhere since modern records began in 1900. A powerful tsunami was triggered that rose 
40.5 metres and in places along the eastern Japanese coast travelled 10 km inland. A recent 
(2014) World Bank publication notes the earthquake yielded an estimated 18,571 deaths, with 
2,651 missing; with an estimated economic cost of ~US$210 billion [1], it is one of the most 
expensive natural disasters in history. 
 
For various reasons March 11th precipitated an immediate crisis of electricity supply, requiring 
the Government and utilities to manage an adjustment of demand and scrape together 
additional supply sources. In the aftermath, policy decisions that were made in response to the 
crisis may have significant long-term implications. From the first days after the catastrophe in 
March 2011 until the unprecedented bailout of TEPCO in the spring of 2012, the crisis has 
breached the 50-year-old utility-government nexus, and further damaged the public's confidence 
in Japan's “nuclear village”. 
 
This paper highlights the immediate challenges that faced following the Great East Japan 
Earthquake and summarises the main events that took place from March 2011 to May 2012. 
Section 2 details the supply-side of the Japanese electricity industry; it exposes the singularities 
of the electricity grid, quantifies the capacity shortage following “The Great Earthquake” and 
addresses the supply-side recovery and the challenges that faced the summer of 2012 for the 
power sector. Sections 3 and 4 address the demand management and demand reduction 
measures, respectively, that lead to the Japanese Electricity System being able to cope with the 
summers of 2011 and 2012. How these measures described in this work have affected Japan’s 
long-term energy policy has been explored in detail in the subsequent work of Grimston et al. 
[2]. 
 
 
2. The Japanese Electricity System Prior to March 11th 2011  
 
Figure 1 provides a schematic overview of Japan’s electricity infrastructure before March 11th 
2011. It comprised (and still comprises in 2014) separate Eastern and Western grids operating 
at different frequencies: East Japan, including Tokyo, operates at 50 Hz whereas West Japan 
(i.e. Osaka) operates at 60 Hz. This unusual division of the electric grid is a pure product of 
history: in the 19th century, Tokyo’s electrical entrepreneurs installed 50 Hz generation 
equipment mainly from Germany while their counterparts in Western Japan bought 60 Hz 
equipment from the United States [3]. Furthermore, the power exchanges between the two grids 
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are limited by the capacity of the existing interconnections. Prior to 2011, only three frequency 
converter facilities were in operation with a total conversion capacity of 1,130 MW [4]. 
 
 
Figure 1: Japan’s Electric Companies (Excluding Okinawa EPCO). Figure Adapted from 
Ref. [5]. 
 
In addition to the divide between Eastern and Western grids, Japan's electricity system is further 
divided regionally. Ten privately-owned electric power companies, also called General 
Electricity Utilities, were (and in 2014 still are) in charge of regional power supply services. Each 
utility was structured as a vertically-integrated regional monopoly, responsible for supplying 
electricity from power generation to transmission and distribution to their consumers in their 
respective service areas [6]. The ten utilities controlled 97% of the market for electricity 
generation and transmission [7] and, in FY 2009, sold 858.5 TWh of electricity [4]. TEPCO, 
which includes Tokyo in its region of supply, served ~29 million customers and was the world's 
largest privately owned electric utility in 2011. In FY 2009, its total sales of electricity amounted 
to 280.1 TWh [8]. Furthermore, wholesale electric utilities, i.e. businesses having supply 
capacity of 2 GW and above (mainly J-Power and JAPC), also supplied electricity to these 
utilities and in some areas operated their own transmission infrastructure [9]. 
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For a long time, the utilities had total monopoly control in their respective service areas. 
However, the 1995 revision of the Electric Utilities Industry Law (along with two later revisions) 
introduced the liberalisation of power generation and partial liberalisation of retail sales [9]. 
These changes in the regulatory environment resulted in wholesale suppliers and power 
producers and suppliers (PPS) entering the market. Wholesale suppliers, like independent 
power producers (IPP), supply electricity to the General Electric Utilities, contracting with them 
for the supply either 1 GW or more for at least ten years or 100 GW for at least five years. PPS 
act as brokers, buying electricity (mostly from manufacturers that generate their own) and 
selling it to commercial customers. They nevertheless depend on utilities' power line networks 
[10]. The relation of Japanese electric power businesses to each other are presented in Figure 
2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Japan’s Electric Power Infrastructure (from April 1 2005). Figure Adapted from 
Ref. [11]. 
 
Even with liberalisation, the utilities remained very powerful. TEPCO was the most powerful and 
has had great influence on the country's affairs, notably through its direct links to METI, other 
government regulatory bodies, and influence within the Keidanren, a business lobby 
representing the voice of large Japanese corporations [12]. TEPCO also had a great deal of 
political power, see e.g. [13]. 
 
Table 1 shows the power generation by energy source for the country and each EPCO for 2010. 
Before the earthquake Japan was dependent on imports for 96% of its primary energy supply, 
or 82% if nuclear is classed as ‘domestic’ energy [4]. Therefore, Japan's energy supply structure 
is vulnerable to volatility in the global market even though it is today the country with the lowest 
primary energy consumption by unit of GDP [14]. As highlighted in Table 1, the mix of energy 
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sources can vary significantly between the different utilities. Prior to March 11th 2011, Japan had 
a total installed generating capacity of 223.6 GW (including the ten EPCOs, J-Power and JAPC) 
with the capacity margins for each EPCO ranging from 0% to 30%. In FY 2009, TEPCO had a 
third of the production capacity of the country with 64.5 GW installed – i.e. equivalent to Italy's 
capacity, and operated 160 hydropower stations (9.0 GW), 26 thermal power stations (38.2 
GW) and seventeen nuclear reactors in three nuclear plants (17.3 GW) [8]. In addition to its own 
capacity, in 2010, TEPCO bought 13.1 GW from wholesale electric utilities and IPPs, setting its 
total power sales at 77.6 GW [8]. 
 
Table 1: The Generation Mix, Supply Capacity and Peak Demand for Japan, its Ten 
EPCOs for FY2010 and Two Wholesale Producers [11,15,16]. 
Electric  
Power  
Company 
LNG Nuclear Coal Hydro Oil Renewables Total 
Capacity 
(GW) 
Peak 
Demand 
(GW) 
Hokkaido 0% 44% 31% 15% 8% 2% 7.4 5.7 
Tohoku 22% 26% 34% 13% 3% 2% 17.2 15.6 
Tokyo 45% 28% 10% 6% 10% 1% 65.0 60.0 
Chubu 48% 13% 26% 9% 3% 1% 32.8 27.1 
Hokuriku 0% 28% 44% 24% 3% 1% 8.1 5.7 
Kansai 20% 44% 21% 10% 5% 1% 34.9 31.0 
Chugoku 19% 3% 58% 6% 13% 1% 12.0 12.0 
Shikoku 5% 43% 36% 9% 6% 1% 7.0 6.0 
Kyushu 19% 39% 27% 5% 7% 3% 20.3 17.5 
Okinawa 0% 0% 77% 0% 21% 2% 1.9 1.5 
10× EPCO  
total 
30% 29% 24% 9% 7% 1% 206.6 177.8 
         
Wholesale  
Power  
Company 
LNG Nuclear Coal Hydro Oil Renewables Total 
Capacity 
(GW) 
Peak 
Demand 
(GW) 
JAPC 0.0% 100% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.6  
J-Power 0.0% 0.0% 49.5% 50.4% 0.0% 0.1% 17.0  
         
Others 
(PPS, etc.) 
      13.6  
  
6 
 
2.1 The Great East Japan Earthquake and its Impact on Japan's Electricity 
Infrastructure  
 
From a power generation perspective, the earthquake and tsunami mainly affected TEPCO, 
Tohoku EPCO, and the independent producer Japan Atomic Power. Contrary to common belief, 
the capacity loss following the March 11th 2011 natural disaster affected not only nuclear 
capacity but also thermal capacity [17] as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Generating Capacity Affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake [17]. 
 Tohoku EPCO TEPCO 
Affected by earthquake   
Thermal capacity 6.1 GW 8.4 GW 
Nuclear capacity 2.2 GW 10.2 GW 
Seriously damaged   
Thermal capacity 3.4 GW 2.6 GW 
Nuclear capacity — 4.7 GW 
 
Overall, five thermal power stations were damaged and eleven out of fifteen nuclear reactors in 
the region were immediately shut down, with the other four already being offline for 
maintenance [17]. Eight of them were safely brought to cold stop conditions but a series of 
incidents occurred at Fukushima Daiichi No. 1–3, leading to the subsequent nuclear accident. 
At the time of the earthquake, TEPCO's generating capacity was 52.0 GW [18]. The earthquake 
and following tsunami affected 18.5 GW of the generating capacity (i.e. 29% of its total capacity 
of 64.5 GW), of which 7.3 GW (11.3%) were destroyed or seriously damaged [17]. Similarly, of 
the 21.2 GW generating capacity of Tohoku EPCO, 8.3 GW (39.3%) were affected by the 
natural disaster and 3.4 GW (16.0%) were seriously damaged. Overall, 10.7 GW (i.e. 5.2% of 
Japanese utilities' capacity) would be lost indefinitely. In addition to the generating capacity, six 
oil refineries in the region were affected by the earthquake and tsunami along with the Sendai 
LNG receiving and regasification terminal [17]. 
 
Further to the physical damage caused by the Earthquake, two external factors added to the 
loss of installed capacity: (1) the nuclear power plants struggled to immediately resume 
operation (as detailed below), and (2) there was limited exchange of electricity due to lack of 
electricity interconnections between the 50 and 60 Hz grids — according to an executive within 
Mitsubishi Electric Power Products, the Western utilities could have covered TEPCO's peak 
demand but, owing to the lack of interconnections, they could only supply up to 1 GW [19]. 
 
On May 6th 2011, Prime Minister Naoto Kan requested the suspension of the Hamaoka nuclear 
plant operated by Chubu EPCO [20]. The plant was believed to be vulnerable due to its location 
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in a particularly seismically active area. Chubu EPCO accepted the request and closed the plant 
on May 15th. Although Prime Minister Kan specified that Hamaoka was an exceptional case, 
many nuclear reactors were already off-line for maintenance at the time of the earthquake or for 
planned maintenance afterwards — i.e. every thirteen months of operations, plants stop for 
refuelling and maintenance for two months. The closure of Hamaoka plant snowballed into a 
freezing of plant restarts throughout the country as local (“prefectural”) governments exercised 
their veto power due to heightened and politicized safety concerns [20]. In Japan, authority over 
nuclear policy is highly fractured. Provincial governors have veto power regarding proposals for 
construction of nuclear plants, alteration and operation [21]. Local governments used their 
power to voice anxiety fuelled by the uncertainty around the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident 
and the rationale of shutting down Hamaoka at the time. Therefore, the number of reactors in 
operations began decreasing. In May 2011, only 22 nuclear reactors out of 54 were still 
operating and the number was down to sixteen reactors by July 2011. In particular, TEPCO was 
left with slightly less than 5 GW in view of the summer peak compared with its 2010 total 
nuclear capacity of 17.3 GW. Figure 3 shows the steady decline in the number of nuclear 
reactors in operations. The last reactor still operating was shut down on May 5th 2012 [22]. 
Whilst Ohi 3 and 4 briefly resumed operation, Japan has not restarted any of its nuclear power 
plants since May 2012, as detailed in [2]. 
 
 
Figure 3: Japanese Nuclear Reactors Online as of May 2012 [23]. 
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2.2 Planned Supply Recovery in View of the Summer 2011 Peak 
 
As Japan's peak demand of electricity occurs during the summer, TEPCO and the government 
devised an action plan for supply recovery during the spring of 2011 in order to recover the 
maximum generating capacity before the summer peak.  
 
 
2.2.1 Measures taken by TEPCO 
 
In order to recover the maximum generation capacity before the summer peak, TEPCO 
undertook four main measures:  
 
(1) Restoring three thermal power stations at Hirono, Hitachinaka and Kashima that were 
severely affected by the earthquake [24]. Hitachinaka (coal plant, total output 1 GW) and 
Kashima (heavy and crude oil, 4.4 GW) resumed operations by mid-May 2011. All units at the 
Hirono power plant (heavy oil, crude oil and coal, total generating capacity of 3.8 GW) had 
resumed operations by mid-July 2011. Overall, this allowed TEPCO to recover 9.2 GW by July.  
 
(2) Restarting Yokosuka thermal power station which had undergone a long-term suspension 
since April 2010. This allowed TEPCO to add ~0.9 GW of capacity [24]. 
 
(3) Installing emergency power supplies in the form of gas turbines and diesel generators on the 
premises of existing thermal plants [24]. On May 13th 2011, TEPCO was confident that it could 
install 1.5 GW by August 2011 [25]. New power supply facilities were procured not only in Japan 
but also overseas and then urgently installed wherever possible in existing thermal stations. 
 
(4) Intensive use of existing thermal plants and in particular LNG and oil-fired thermal plants 
[23]. Figure 4 shows the average utilization rate of thermal power plants (usually used as middle 
to peak load supply) increased by ~150% by February 2012. 
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Figure 4: Usage of Power Plants One Year after the Great East Japan Earthquake. Figure 
Adapted from Ref. [23]. 
 
Measures (1)–(3) enabled TEPCO to recover ~11 GW by mid-July 2011, restoring its generating 
capacity to 55.6 GW. However, measure (4) turned out to be the most important factor to 
support the supply recovery.  
 
These actions were to some extent made possible by the structure of the Japanese electric 
power business. Indeed, as a monopoly with limited interconnections, TEPCO required its own 
reserve capacity, explaining why such capacity could rapidly ramp up their production. 
 
 
2.2.2 Measures taken by the government 
 
The government also undertook different legal actions to support TEPCO in its supply recovery 
efforts. 
 
(1): the Japanese government relaxed two main pieces of regulation: (a) the application of the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Act to additional emergency thermal power supply facilities 
was waived [26] — that is to say that the environmental impact was not a necessary 
consideration in the design phase of these emergency facilities; and (b) the postponement for 
up to one year of periodic inspections of thermal plants under the Electricity Business Act. This 
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prevented additional plants from going off-line for maintenance and inspection during the 
summer peak [26]. 
 
(2) METI requested companies with private power generation capacity to sell their electricity 
directly to TEPCO. In addition, the promotion of private power generation provided grants to 
cover the installation of generating equipment and the fuel costs [26]. As a result, TEPCO 
received 1.6 GW of additional electricity from the 10 GW of installed private capacity in its 
service area (and Tohoku EPCO received 0.2 GW from the 4 GW installed). However, some 
critics have argued that measures taken to source private power generation capacity destroyed 
competition. Private generators were unable to take advantage of TEPCO's capacity shortage 
to gain market shares as they had to sell their electricity to TEPCO, evidencing the influence of 
TEPCO. Some companies like Ennet even had to sell at a lower price than what it charged its 
own customers, leading to monthly losses of $130,000 [10].  
 
 
2.3 Power supply outlook in view of 2011 summer peak 
 
During spring 2011, TEPCO published monthly press releases presenting its actions taken to 
recover supply and the estimation of its supply capacity for the summer 2011. Hence, on April 
8th, it estimated it would have re-established its generating capacity at 46.5 GW. By mid- May, it 
re-estimated its summer capacity at 55.2 GW [18]. Taking into account the 1.4 GW power 
transfer to the Tohoku region which contained many disaster-stricken areas, TEPCO's predicted 
supply capacity in view of the summer was of 53.8 GW and was the basis of its policy package 
to reduce electricity demand. 
 
With the shutdown of nuclear plants, the installation of new thermal power supplies and the 
more intensive use of existing thermal plants, Japan's LNG imports increased by 13.5% from 
2010 to 2012, and overall fossil fuel requirements for electricity generation increased by 45% 
[27], which matched mid-2011 predictions detailed in Figure 5. Japan managed to secure extra 
supplies of fossil fuels, notably LNG, thanks to the immediate offers of foreign governments and 
LNG sellers of countries including Qatar, Russia, Australia and Indonesia [28]. Qatar delivered 
nearly 12 million tons (~150% increase from the previous year), accounting for the largest 
portion of the increase in Japan's LNG imports [27]. Simultaneously, Japanese companies 
including Tokyo Gas, Osaka Gas, Chubu Electric and Chukogu Electric, as well as Korea's 
KOGAS diverted their LNG cargoes to TEPCO [28]. At the end of 2011, total power production 
in Japan stood at 188.8 GWh of which hydropower represented 6.3% (cf. 6.2% in 2010), 
thermal 83.1% (cf. 57.7% in 2010) and nuclear 10.3% (cf. 35.7% in 2010), meaning a significant 
shift to fossil fuels. 
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Figure 5: Mid-2011 Predictions of Increased Fossil Fuel Requirements for Electricity 
Generation for 2012. Figure Adapted from Ref. [29]. 
 
It was posited that if the Japanese nuclear plants did not resume operations while the yen 
depreciates as observed recently, the value of Japan's LNG imports would increase by +86% 
from ¥3.5 trillion (€35 billion) in 2010 to ¥6.5 trillion (€65 billion) in 2012 [27]. To cover the higher 
cost of thermal generation, which added ¥830 billion to its electricity bill, TEPCO announced on 
January 17th 2012 that the electricity price for large commercial users would increase by 17% as 
of April 2012. During 2011–2012, TEPCO were expected to apply for regulatory permission to 
increase rates for residential users (permission that is not required for the larger users) [30]. 
 
Even with the increase in fossil-fuel generation over 2011, power shortages were expected for 
five utilities for Summer 2012, as detailed in Table 3; although as detailed in Ref. [2] these 
shortages were successfully circumvented. 
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 Table 3: Original Estimates for the Predicted Shortfall of Electricity Supplies in Summer 
2012 [31]. 
 Estimated 
Capacity (GW) 
Estimated 
Demand (GW) 
Nuclear 
Share 
Shortfall 
Margin 
Hokkaido 4.7 4.8 34.1% -2.1% 
Tohoku 14.9 14.2 21.6% 4.7% 
Tokyo 51.9 57.4 27.9% -11.0% 
Chubu 27.5 26.5 13.3% 3.6% 
Hokuriku 5.7 5.3 35.0% 7.0% 
Kansai 25.3 29.6 45.1% -17.0% 
Chugoku 12.3 11.5 14.6% 14.0% 
Shikoku 5.3 5.7 40.6% -7.5% 
Kyushu 15.3 17.1 41.6% -11.8% 
9× EPCO total 163.0 172.3 29.2% -5.7% 
 
 
3. Japanese Government's Demand Management 
 
Beginning with the immediate fortnight after March 11th 2011, there is a sharp contrast between 
the chaotic first ten days of electricity supply management and the systematic planning for a 
comprehensive and effective policy package to cut demand for summer 2011.  From March 11th 
to 24th, the Japanese government committed to the recovery of the damage-stricken region of 
eastern Japan. The quick fossil-fuel ramp-up proved the existence of well-designed contingency 
plans for power plants. However, the Government struggled to set up a crisis management plan 
for the drop in electricity generation capacity. Had this contingency plan been ready in advance, 
the Government and TEPCO would have been saved a substantial amount of time and 
embarrassment. 
 
The decision-making bodies were initially overwhelmed by the scale and complexity of the crisis 
during the first two days. Whilst the loss in capacity would have put any government into an 
emergency state, the power generation capacity loss was a minute concern compared to the 
loss of life and infrastructure magnitude of damage caused by the earthquake and tsunami that 
overwhelmed the government. Furthermore, TEPCO's top executives were away from their 
offices when the utility was stricken by the catastrophe — at a time when leadership was most 
needed. In fact, the firm's top two executives did not arrive at the Tokyo headquarters until 
roughly 20 hours after the earthquake [32]. As a result of these combined factors the whole area 
of northern Tokyo was subject to unplanned blackouts. TEPCO and Tohoku Electric Power 
(TEP) reported that a combined seven million homes were without electricity at the height of the 
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event, including at least four million in and around the greater Tokyo metropolitan area [33]. 
According to official figures, this represented approximately 19 million people without power 
(almost 15% of the Japanese population).   
 
On March 14th 2011, the Government and TEPCO met to plan rolling power outages. Although 
these outages were necessary, their design reveals the technical unpreparedness of TEPCO, 
and added electrical chaos to the already catastrophic situation. In order to lower the social cost 
of the power outages, METI announced a plan for rolling power outages on Sunday March 13th 
just after midnight- without providing any explanation to the public for the rationale of such an 
announcement [34]. These outages were implemented as follows: consumers in TEPCO's 
jurisdiction were divided into five groups that corresponded to existing cells of the network. The 
electricity supply was stopped in one group after another according to a predetermined 
schedule (the period from 06:20 to 22:00 was divided into five zones and blackouts were 
conducted for three hours at most) [34]. 
  
The government asked TEPCO not to implement shortages in the central Tokyo grid cell 
because of the presence of central Government offices and many company headquarters; 
however, no distinction was made within other cells and critical facilities were deprived of 
electricity [35]. On March 14th, the Ministry of Health declared that small clinics might be 
compromised by the blackouts; disruption was also expected for railway and traffic 
management services [36,37]. Hence, TEPCO had the ability to control the implementation of 
blackouts at the grid-cell level but not at the sub grid-cell level. It took them two additional 
weeks to refine their outage planning so as to spare areas of industrial interest [38]. Once again 
these distinctions could have been made earlier had TEPCO devised a capacity drop 
contingency plan. 
 
The consequences of this unpreparedness were combined with a lack of appropriate 
communication. First, the government failed to explain the situation to the population and justify 
the implementation of blackouts. Two weeks afterwards on March 24th, the first official meeting 
of the government about the electricity crisis took place [38] where the Government declared 
that they had “no other reliable means to curb electricity demand” because power consumption 
had to be restricted at the peak only and it did not have the power to force households and 
small retailers to cut their demand [39]. Second, as it was learning how to manage the crisis in 
real time, it gradually appeared to METI that the population needed further information as to 
how the blackouts were to be implemented. 
 
Had METI and TEPCO prepared an emergency procedure to setup power outages, these 
measures could have been implemented from day one, and would have limited the negative 
reputational cost. From hereafter, the PM cabinet seconded by METI, took control of the 
situation. METI implemented a survival power outage scheme, which prevented the whole 
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region from diving into the dark again following those first few days. Since the electricity supply 
and demand crisis was just a minute part of the picture, it is understandable that a polished 
communication plan on blackouts was neither the priority of the Government nor TEPCO.  But 
had the stakeholders already devised a capacity drop emergency plan, exceptions could have 
been set up more expeditiously and fairly, and the population would have been much better 
informed. On March 24th, the Government met and decided that there should be two more 
weeks of outages (with improved planning on the grid sub-cell level) and was forced to 
acknowledge that the country was about to face an unprecedented challenge of surviving the 
summer demand peak without power outages. 
 
On March 25th, 14 days after the catastrophe, METI held a meeting about TEPCO's capacity 
recovery and established the Electricity Supply-Demand Emergency Response Headquarters 
(ESDERH) led by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, including the Agency for Natural Resources and 
Energy (ANRE), the National Public Safety Commission and TEPCO experts. The ESDERH 
mission was to devise a policy package by the end of April 2011 to drastically change the 
electricity demand structure so as to avoid power outage enforcement during the summer [39].  
 
 
3.1 Mobilisation for Summer 2011 
 
As a result of the 2011 crisis, the IEA updated its series of guidelines for policy makers to 
achieve large-scale demand-side electricity savings as quickly as possible [37]. Although the 
policy package devised in Japan was reasonably in-line with the best practices recommended 
by the IEA, better communication of data between stakeholders could have improved the 
process. 
 
The first step of these guidelines involves determining of the cause and duration of the 
shortage. In this case, the Tohoku earthquake caused a capacity shortage (as opposed to an 
energy shortage when demand exceeds energy input available for electricity generation). The 
recommended response is a focus on load shifting, that is, a reduction of the electricity 
consumption only during peak hours, when the supply-demand balance is jeopardized. Initially, 
this was what the Government attempted to do but a more substantial plan was needed for the 
longer-term management of the system. The second step involves identifying opportunities for 
electricity savings. The Japanese Government encountered two major difficulties: (1) sector-
specific data was not immediately available and so the energy saving campaign could have 
been implemented much faster [37]. To address this problem of limited sector-specific data, the 
government convened periodic meetings with groups of outside researchers, government 
energy officials, and TEPCO staff to estimate load curves, predict energy-savings potential for 
each sector and develop specific recommendations for saving electricity. (2) Japan was already 
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an energy efficient country with the lowest energy supply per unit of GDP, about 20% lower than 
the OECD average [40]. METI was thus facing a tough challenge. 
 
The IEA proposed a series of five tools for governments to save electricity, some of which were 
used by the Japanese Government: 
 
1: Price signals (time-of-use pricing, real-time pricing, and critical-peak pricing). Only the biggest 
electricity customers had access to the requisite metering technologies therefore the 
Government chose not to implement this measure. 
 
2: Behaviour change campaigns. The Japanese Government made extensive use of various 
behavioural campaigns as detailed in Section 4.2. 
 
3: Market mechanisms (such as consumption rationing and credit trading). The Japanese 
Government did not use these schemes that might have enabled companies to sell low-value 
consumption credits to others. 
 
4: Rationing (both targeted and/or general). The Japanese Government considered these 
measures as a safety net only — as although some rationing strategies are less disruptive than 
others, it is a less desirable of a tool than others. 
 
5: Technology replacement (generally for long-term savings). Japanese LED-lighting sales 
reached 40% of market share, double the pre-crisis share, and for the first time surpassed 
incandescent lamp sales [37]. 
 
By Mid-May — much behind the expected schedule — METI came out with the definitive 
forecast shown in Figure 6. In Tokyo, the expected supply and demand gap was -10.3% 
compared to 2011. Rolling blackouts were considered the worst possible outcome [39], 
therefore any demand reduction needed to ensure a 5% safety buffer. Overall, it meant that 
demand reduction had to be 15% for the whole country. 
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Figure 6: Estimation for Electricity Supply and Forecasted Demand in the TEPCO Service 
Area for Summer 2011. Figure Adapted from Ref. [37].  
 
  
3.2 The Policy Package 
 
As a result of TEPCO's huge efforts to recover supply capacity, the reduction target was 
eventually set to 15% from July 1st to September 22nd on business days from 09:00 to 20:00 
[41]. Albeit necessary, the target was overly ambitious because the Government hardly had the 
legal means to enforce it beyond large electricity consumers. 
 
In Japan, there is a legal difference between the different types of electricity customers. 
According to Article 27 of the 1964 Electricity Business Act [42], only large electricity contractors 
(>500kW) can be legally required to reduce their consumption. In cases where the target is not 
met, the Government sets a fine of more than ¥1 million (£7,600) per hour. There were 
exceptions such as disaster stricken zones and specific industries [28]; a lower reduction target 
(5–10%) was proposed for particular end-users such as hospitals, nursing homes, public 
transport and water utilities [37]. For smaller electricity contractors (<500kW), METI only played 
an educating role and targets were not mandatory [43]. METI also held educational workshops 
in small business offices. Finally, the government promoted casual and cooler clothing through 
the ‘Super Coolbiz’ campaign which aimed at reducing energy consumption of air conditioning 
systems by asking office workers to change their fashion habits [44]. For the domestic sector, 
the Government prepared a “Menu for households to save electricity” [26] and launched a public 
information campaign including newspaper, TV and internet advertisements. It even asked 
households to commit to a “Home Electricity Saving Declaration” featuring ten measures to 
achieve the 15% reduction that could be taken concerning different appliances commonly found 
in Japanese homes: air conditioning, refrigerators, lighting, television, toilet seats with warmers 
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and water spray functions, and rice cookers [45]. A power-saving contest in the residential 
sector was also created, rewarding customers for meeting their energy-saving targets [37].  
 
 
4. The Process of Electricity Demand Reduction 
 
A maximal demand of 60 GW was observed on July 19 2010. TEPCO forecasted that its supply 
for summer 2011 would be 53.8 GW (a -10.3% capacity margin). As shown in Section 3.2, the 
Japanese authorities decided to aim at a 15% demand reduction during summer 2011, dividing 
demand into three main categories: large consumers (15% mandatory reduction), small 
businesses, and households (15% reduction requested for both). Figure 7 shows the peak 
electricity demand in 2011 cf. 2010, and the important reductions observed in the Tokyo and 
Tohoku regions.  
 
Figure 7: 2011 Peak Electricity Demand (GW), Compared with 2010 Peak Demand 
(dotted). Figure Adapted from Ref. [46]. 
  
Overall, the actions taken by the government were successful as the initial 15% reduction target 
was achieved. With that said, the summer of 2011 was colder than the summer of 2010. 
Therefore, it is difficult to determine precisely the effectiveness of Japanese users' efforts to 
lower their electricity consumption because air-conditioning accounts for an important part of 
electricity consumption. In that perspective, Nagatomi, a researcher at IEEJ, has estimated the 
net electricity saving rates based on an analysis that corrects for the differences in temperature 
in the Tokyo and Tohoku regions [27]. The results are presented in Figure 8, which shows that 
the temperature had a strong impact in August 2011, since it accounted for ~25% of demand 
reduction. In June and July, though, it still helped to reduce consumption and the temperature's 
share in total reduction was lower. The achieved demand reductions vary from one sector to 
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another: household reductions ranged from 6–11% (cf. 15% target); Small businesses achieved 
with a 19% reduction (cf. 15% target); large consumers achieved a 27–29%, albeit partly due to 
the legally binding target. Again, the reduction in consumption in all sectors was due in part to a 
colder summer. 
 
Figure 8: Breakdown of the Factors Explaining the Electricity Demand Reduction in the 
TEPCO Area. Figure Adapted from Ref. [47]. 
 
 
4.1 Implementation of an Electricity-Saving Strategy 
 
Considering the 10.3% electricity supply gap described previously, the Government announced 
its summer electricity-saving strategy, which aimed at a conservative 15% demand reduction 
target for the whole country. It is worth noting that a lower target (5–10%) was proposed for 
particular end-users such as hospitals, nursing homes, public transport, and water utilities [37]. 
Whereas specific requirements from the Japanese authorities have been presented earlier, the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) enforced its own emergency power-saving program on 
May 27th 2011. It was devised to complement the National Government's measures and aimed 
at “freeing [Japanese] society from its excessive dependence on electricity” [48]. In that 
perspective, complementary efforts were emphasized to aid each sector with achieving their 
15% reduction target. In order to help large electricity consumers, emergency power 
conservation seminars were organized and attended by approximately 2,000 businesses. The 
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city also helped small consumers by coordinating power-saving measures, publishing reports 
and organizing workshops. A primary action proposed to these users was to reduce lighting (i.e. 
switching off lights, removing lights, and in some cases using low-power bulbs). With regard to 
the residential sector, energy conservation advisors visited more than 300,000 households from 
mid-June to the end of September 2011. The city also promoted the ‘Electricity Action Month’, 
which was held at public elementary schools and high schools and encouraged 1 million 
children to save electricity. Additionally, a subsidy program was implemented to foster home 
power generation through photovoltaic and gas cogeneration systems. Finally, efforts were 
carried out at TMG facilities: a 29% reduction from the previous summer was achieved at TMG 
main buildings. Interestingly, the city had already listed measures that could be taken to lower 
electricity consumption before the Great Earthquake, with the objective of lowering carbon 
emissions. Therefore, actions were taken in all TMG-related facilities, with emissions reduction 
measures already in place. 
 
 
4.2 Customers' Reaction 
 
Whereas it is clear that many actions have been taken to lower electricity consumption, a share 
of the reduction is arguably the result of lower production caused by disrupted supply chains. 
However, according to the Fujitsu Research Institute, the recovery of supply chain operations in 
Japan was very quick, with 90% recovery by the end of July 2011 [49]. Therefore, the 
government policy package was likely more effective than the destruction of supply chains in 
the industry's electricity consumption reduction.  
 
 
4.2.1 Large consumers 
 
Overall, large industrial consumers executed a 27–29% reduction in power demand, compared 
to summer 2010. The strategies of companies from two different industries are analysed below 
[26]. (1) For the electronics manufacturers, a reduction of (20–34%) in power consumption was 
achieved by: purchasing and leasing private power generation, shifting of work to holidays and 
night-time, production adjustment, and lowering air-conditioning and lighting. Costs incurred by 
the company amounted to ¥4 billion (€40 million) mostly due to private power generation, fuel 
and labour costs after shift changes. Moreover, sales plans had to be modified and led to lower 
sales results, which incurred further costs for the company. Also production decreased by 10–
15% whilst private power generation equipment was being installed. (2) For iron and steel 
companies, a 26% reduction in power consumption was achieved by shifting work hours, 
relocating production to the West, implementing private power generation and electricity-saving 
activities, and increasing the efficiency of their facilities. Costs were estimated to be nearly ¥8.6 
20 
 
billion (€86 million) and were caused by additional fuel for private power generation, labour 
costs from shifting work schedules, increased inventories, decreased production, and 
opportunity cost due to non-use of contracted electricity. 
 
 
4.2.2 Small businesses 
 
The 15% target was achieved with a 19% reduction observed for small consumers across the 
Tokyo area. According to a questionnaire from the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
[26], 26% of small customers claimed to have carried out reductions greater than 20%. Several 
approaches to reducing electricity consumption were implemented: shifting of work hours, 
demand response monitoring equipment, private power generation, heat insulation, energy 
saving training workshops for employees, reduction in air-conditioning use and lighting systems. 
Moreover, when electricity was supplied jointly to industrial complexes which multiple tenants, 
the site was treated as a large user and small and medium enterprises in the cooperative 
implemented rolling operation shutdowns. While many companies recognised the merits to 
energy savings measures, such as improved electricity usage, many pointed out cost increases, 
decreased production volumes and increased workload for employees. 
 
 
4.2.3 Households 
 
Residential electricity consumption accounted for ~30% of electricity demand in Tokyo in 2010. 
The breakdown of this consumption is shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Breakdown of Electricity Consumption for a Household in Tokyo Area before 
the Crisis. Figure Adapted from Ref. [45]. 
 
The Agency of Natural Resources and Energy published nine energy-saving recommendations 
for the residential sector, with the expected power saving effects. The latter has been advertised 
by means of various media such as Internet and television. A study was conducted to analyse 
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these electricity-savings measures of the residential sector in Tokyo during summer 2011 [50]. 
Interviews were performed along with questionnaires in order to assess strategies employed by 
households to decrease their electricity consumption. According to the authors, 10% savings 
were achieved on average after the weather normalization adjustment. In addition, it was 
estimated that approximately 40% of electricity were achieved from lowering the use of air 
conditioning. Figure 10 presents the main electricity conservation measures and their effects. 
When implemented, reducing the number of refrigerators in use decreased the volume of 
electricity used by a household by roughly 11%. Switching to energy-efficient refrigerators was 
also efficient since it produced a 10% decrease in power consumption. On the other hand, 
adjusting the consumption levels of appliances such as television brightness and refrigerator 
temperature had negligible effects. Reducing the time of use of air-conditioning systems was 
had the greatest impact, and adjusting air-conditioner temperature settings was ranked as the 
second greatest savings measure in terms of overall effect, emphasizing again the importance 
of air-conditioning in lowering household demand. 
 
 
Figure 10: Assessment of the Main Measures Implemented by Households. Figure 
Adapted from Ref. [50]. 
 
The study also analysed what the electricity conservation motives were for households. Three 
reoccurring responses seem to explain why people chose to lower their power consumption. 
First, households wanted to contribute to the resolution of the electricity shortage crisis. Second, 
respondents were not aware of electricity reduction methods used until, they learned of them 
through the tips provided by the government in information campaigns. Third, households were 
recognizing opportunities to lower their electricity bills. 
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Interestingly, the results of the household survey showed that only 5.8% of households felt it 
had been difficult for them to save electricity, while most stated that they were able to save 
electricity without difficulty [26]. With regard to long-term effects, over 90% of households 
affirmed that they would continue electricity savings in the future. Specifically, over 60% of them 
contended that they wanted to continue reducing their consumption by 10% or more. While 
ANRE's survey results are in concordance with Nishio and Ofuji's study, their calculations also 
show that many households have carried out lighting reductions. 81% of the respondents used 
reductions in lighting to reduce their consumption, while a shift from air-conditioning usage to 
electric fans and/or modification of air-conditioner settings were used by 77% and 73% of the 
sampled population respectively. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The Great East Japan earthquake heralded a significant reduction in capacity due to the 
damage in thermal generation and that gradual closure of Japan’s nuclear power plants. The 
reduction in capacity was exacerbated by limited interconnections and the vertically-integrated 
monopolistic structures that comprised the Japanese electricity system. The subsequent 
response comprised a significant drive to bring replacement fossil-fired capacity online coupled 
with demand-side reductions that were developed on the fly. All-in-all, the targets for reducing 
consumption, and avoiding rolling blackouts, in 2011 were achieved. An interesting question is 
how these short-term, hastily-enacted emergency measures will impact future Japanese energy 
policy, and is investigated further in the work of Grimston et al. [2].   
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